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 4 
Abstract 
 This thesis paper provides an evaluation of international criminal tribunals and 
their ability to incite sustainable peace in ethnically conflicted regions of the world.  This 
research focuses particularly on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the role it has played in reconciling ethnic tensions in the 
Balkans. First, an extensive review of the literature concerning international jurisdiction 
provides background information on the two opposing views of international relations: 
realism and legalism. Both perspectives of international relations have significant 
implications for the effectiveness of this UN Tribunal and whether or not such supra-
national institutions are ultimately effective. The most significant element of research, 
however, was done in conjunction with the ICTY Outreach Programme office in The 
Hague, Netherlands, and with the organization Human Rights Watch.  After an extensive 
evaluation of the Tribunal’s development over the last decade, and most importantly, the 
activities of the ICTY Outreach Programme in the states which formerly comprised 
Yugoslavia, the conclusion is reached that the ICTY provides an effective model for 
other international criminal tribunals. Recommendations for international policy and 
further research are also provided. 
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Introduction 
 One of the most striking developments of the twenty-first century has been the 
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights: a standardized, globally 
accepted norm establishing the most basic and fundamental rights to which each human 
being is entitled. Furthermore, as a result of globalization, a number of supra-national 
governing bodies have been created to mediate the complex relationships between states 
in this new world order.  The unprecedented interconnectedness of modern states and the 
establishment of universal human rights have had both positive and negative 
consequences – creating a mix of solidarity and ambiguity in the international 
community.   
 In 1995, Richard Holbrooke referred to the former Yugoslavia as “the greatest 
collective security failure of the West since the 1930s.”1 The subsequent ad hoc tribunal 
that was established to try war criminals responsible for committing grave atrocities 
during the conflict has become a test to the efficacy of international jurisdiction. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an UN-mandated, ad 
hoc tribunal which seeks to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed during the 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and foster reconciliation among ethnic groups in the Balkans. 
It is the first war crimes tribunal to be established since the Nuremburg trials of World 
War II, and was created in conjunction with a tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
 International criminal court systems are revolutionary in the context of world 
history, and it is likely they will continue to play a very important role in international 
policy in the future. The greatest concern of international court systems in general is 
establishing legitimacy; this can only be accomplished if international criminal tribunals 
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are seen overwhelmingly as fair and impartial, rather than as institutions cloaking 
“victor’s justice” or Western ideology. The ICTY provides the best standard for 
comparison precisely because it has been used as a model for other tribunals and as 
justification for the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Evaluating the effectiveness of the ICTY is thus vital in order to determine whether it is 
actually an effective model that should continue to be replicated in the future. 
 Overall, the ICTY has many forces working against it: The historical precedent 
that tribunals fail to establish peace, the inherently problematic issue of collective action 
in the international community, and the prevalent notion that UN institutions are 
structurally ineffective. Despite this, international tribunals are a growing phenomenon 
and are vehemently advocated by the most powerful nations as a necessary first step in 
the process of building peace and reconciliation. This paper seeks to address the main 
concerns associated with them – namely, do international criminal courts achieve their 
goal of peace and reconciliation? And if so, what specific mechanism of the court system 
causes this? 
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Literature Review 
Executive Summary 
There is an overwhelming amount of literature written on the topic of 
international criminal law. This review seeks to provide a critical analysis of the two 
major opposing arguments at work: Realism and an “idealist” legalism. With regard to 
state sovereignty, realists hold that global institutions, like international courts, are 
inherently flawed and biased while simultaneously infringing on state sovereignty. In an 
anarchic system of states, where power and influence are what matters, global institutions 
will be limited in their effectiveness. Legalists, however, will argue that international 
criminal law has slowly, but surely, created precedence of individual accountability and 
justice for victims of human rights abuses in the international system. In the former 
Yugoslavia, legalists argue the ICTY has been effective at apprehending major war 
criminals – Slobodan Milosević being the most notable – although it has taken many 
years and shaky cooperation on behalf of the international community. 
 
Introduction 
The view that international criminal tribunals are a form of victor’s justice is as 
old as international relations. As Thucydides said, “the standard of justice depends on the 
equality of power to compel.”2 Realists have criticized institutions like the International 
Criminal Court and war tribunals for moralizing foreign policy, and are skeptical of them 
because they merely reflect the underlying balance of power. Therefore, the main issue to 
be addressed is questioning the two opposing theories of international relations with 
regard to this topic: Namely, are such tribunals fair and unbiased and thus beneficial to 
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 Meernik, “Victor’s Justice or the Law,” p. 144 
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the promotion of peace, according to legalists and idealist theory? Or, are they infused 
with the politics of major world powers that can interfere with the efforts to end the cycle 
of violence, according to a Realist perspective?  
 
Sovereignty and International Law: Reconcilable Differences? 
Sovereignty 
 The principle of sovereignty holds that the state, itself, is the ultimate source of 
political authority within its territory.  States are accorded freedom from un-requested 
external interference in the domestic affairs of the state, particularly if this interference is 
coercive in nature.3  The implication, therefore, is that states are not, and should not be, 
subject to the authority of any higher institution or Principle, which therefore creates an 
underlying conflict when dealing with supra-national governing bodies like the ICC and 
the ICTY. 
 From a Realist perspective of international relations, state sovereignty provides a 
measure of stability, predictability, and order within the anarchic system of nation-states.  
As Bruce Cronin states in his research on this topic, “it is the single equalizer in world of 
great inequality.”4 Especially for weak states, this principle of sovereignty provides a 
political and legal deterrent to the imposition of values and policies by more powerful 
states.  
 However, Cronin also notes the negative side of sovereignty as well. While it 
protects weak states from coercion and external interference, for strong states, 
sovereignty provides the legal justification to allow them to define and pursue their 
                                                 
3
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interests unilaterally without being subjected to the will of an international majority. 5  
Consequently, this relieves the powerful states of the obligation to help the weak (like 
populations suffering human rights abuses, for example) when they do not believe it to be 
in their best interests to do so.  
 In both of these cases, the principles of sovereignty enable the societies of both 
strong and weak states to develop their own domestic institutions based on their unique 
values and principles. 
Sovereignty and the International System 
 In the international arena, sovereignty becomes a very complex issue, and only 
becomes harder to mediate as states become more closely intertwined as a result of 
globalization.  The complex relationships that arise from international interdependence 
impose limitations on a state’s will to be independent.  As Cronin suggests, most political 
leaders of the world recognize that a stable, predictable, and functional international order 
requires formal rules that define acceptable behavior, regulate political interaction, and 
facilitate the resolution of conflicts.6 Because states receive their sovereignty, at least in 
part, from their recognition as legitimate political actors in international affairs, the 
international community has long claimed the right to place limits and responsibilities on 
state action.7   
 Chief among a state’s responsibilities is to provide for the security and wellbeing 
of its population (and obviously, forms of mass violence like genocide and ethnic 
cleansing are the ultimate negation of this responsibility). Therefore, Cronin points out, 
because states have extensive authority over their territories, they are responsible for 
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ensuring that conditions within their borders do not threaten international peace and 
security.  When they abdicate this responsibility, it is generally assumed that the broader 
community is obliged to take action to rectify the situation.8 Ethnic violence not only 
provokes gross human rights abuses, but these events also tend to produce mass refugee 
flows, cross-border guerilla movements, and create tensions with neighboring states. 
Thus, the international community is directly impacted by these occurrences and has a 
stake and interest, as well as a moral duty, to do everything within its power to prevent 
situations like these from occurring. 
Sovereignty and a New World Order 
 In June 1992, the changing nature of international security problems and the 
central concept of sovereignty were addressed in the UN secretary generals’ report, An 
Agenda for Peace. In it, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, emphasized the need to improve 
preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and maintaining of 
peace after wars (civil or international). He stated:  
The foundation of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its 
fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common 
international progress. The time of absolute sovereignty, however, has 
passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of the leaders 
of states today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs 
of good international governance and the requirements of an ever more 
interdependent world.9 
 
The passing of the Cold War and the resulting new arrangement of international affairs 
raised the cost of states excluding themselves from the international sphere.  
                                                 
8
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9
 Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, par. 17, as cited by James Gow, “Shared Sovereignty, Enhanced 
Security: Lessons from the Yugoslav War,” from State Sovereignty, ed. by Sohail H Hashmi, University 
Park (1997): 152. 
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Subsequently, it also raised the level of accountability for powerful states to remain 
complacent when norms of the international system were not being honored. 
 
The International Criminal Court 
The ICC and State Sovereignty 
 Throughout the twentieth century, state sovereignty has been one of the most 
enduring obstacles for advancing international criminal law. While the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) signifies the immanent demise of this link 
between sovereignty and impunity, it reveals the continuing importance of state 
compliance and cooperation. Whatever the obstacles that state compliance poses, the ICC 
can be seen as the culmination of a long struggle to ensure that the worst perpetrators of 
gross human rights abuses will be held accountable for their crimes.10 
Background: The ICC 
 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, permanent court that 
tries persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.11 It is a court of last resort and it will 
not act if a case is investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system, unless the 
national proceedings are disingenuous. The clear advantage of the ICC is the power to 
prosecute without the consent of the defendant’s state of nationality. This jurisdictional 
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 Steven Roach, Politicizing the International Criminal Court: The Convergence of Politics, Ethics, and 
Law. New York (2006): 19. 
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 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 5, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9. 
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structure circumvents the problem of perpetrator regimes shielding their own nationals 
from justice, something that is not uncommon in situations of this severe nature.12 
Establishing Legitimacy 
 The jurisdiction and functioning of the court is governed by its founding treaty, 
the Rome Statute, and signed by 108 countries.13 The ICC’s juridical power is flexible 
insofar as it has no centralized mechanism of enforcement and it is dependent on state 
cooperation (and its legitimacy) to implement and enforce its rules and procedures.14 It is 
essential to note that, while it has 108 member countries, many critical world powers are 
not signatories, namely the United States, Russia, and China,15 which is potentially 
damaging to the courts legitimacy and power to enforce compliance.  
 This question of legitimacy is also essential for assessing the feasibility of 
establishing a truly international criminal law system using procedures and personnel 
adapted from a variety of national judicial systems.16 It begs the question: is it possible to 
weave together diverse judicial systems and legal norms to deliver justice that fulfills 
demands for retribution while protecting the rights of the accused? The outcome of the 
courts have the potential to provide the quality of justice required to legitimize 
international law and promote peaceful conflict resolution, but if history is any indication 
of the likely outcome, it will probably not be favorable. 17 
Weaknesses 
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 While the institutional mechanism exists to try the accused and to deliver justice 
to victims, there are several major impediments to the effectiveness of this court. 
Bassiouni notes that in 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted the “Resolution on War 
Criminals,” affirming that a State’s refusal “to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial, 
and punishment” of persons accused or convicted of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity is “contrary to the United Nations Charter and to generally recognized norms of 
international law.”18 Furthermore, in 1973 a resolution entitled Principles of International 
Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity was also adopted by the Assembly.19 Despite 
these resolutions, Bassiouni points out that no specialized international convention has 
been passed on this subject, and, therefore, the duty to prosecute or to extradite remains 
to be proven part of customary international law rather than an established obligation.20 
 Moreover, national enforcement of humanitarian crimes is difficult as few states 
recognize the application of universitality, and accordingly, few countries have enacted 
national legislation needed to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity. 21 
 In practice, there are also significant weaknesses with respect to states carrying 
out the duties to prosecute or extradite criminals, and for states to cooperate with each 
other in the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of those charged with such 
crimes.22   
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 Overall, it seems there are sufficient human rights norms in the international 
system, but what is lacking is the political will to enforce them. Even though an 
international criminal court is established, it will have to be considered as being on the 
same continuum as national criminal courts and all these legal systems will have to work 
in a complementary way to reinforce one another in order to achieve effective 
deterrence.23 
The Politics of Intervention 
 Despite an overwhelming consensus that there is a moral responsibility to stop 
atrocities like genocide or ethnic cleansing, political leaders remain hesitant to support 
intervention even when such events are confirmed.24 Humanitarian concerns are only one 
factor in the decision for outside forces intervene.  In most cases, it must also be 
politically advantageous to do so. For this reason, many states in the developing world, as 
well as competing major powers, have viewed specific cases of intervention as 
unjustified violations of sovereignty, making it difficult to gain a consensus on the need 
for action. 
Sovereignty and Responsibility: A Problem of Collective Action 
 After many years of disagreement over the issue, Cronin argues that there is now 
a general consensus that States do, in fact, have both the right and the responsibility to 
intervene in cases of genocide. The overarching problem is one of collective action. 
States continue to be suspicious of each other’s motives, while at the same time, they 
balk at themselves paying the cost in lives and resources to protect another country’s 
population. International procedures for stopping genocide mandate that intervention is 
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supposed to be limited to alleviating the humanitarian crisis while protecting the 
sovereignty of the offending state. That is, defeating the enemy or altering the political 
make-up of the government constitutes a violation of established norms of sovereignty. 
As a result, powerful and influential states are unlikely to intervene in situations where it 
is not politically (or economically) advantageous to do so, a manifestation of realism.25 In 
the long term, it is unlikely this trend will waiver significantly. 
 Cronin affirms this point when he states: 
…The ability of the international community to oppose genocide has also 
been hampered by the opposite problem rooted in the principle of 
sovereignty: Even when most states agree that acts of genocide have 
occurred and that such actions are violations of international law, those 
with the ability to act have refused to do so, drawing on their sovereign 
right not to put their citizens at risk to protect a foreign population.26 
 
 Therefore, “the institution of sovereignty provides a cover for the great powers to avoid 
their responsibilities when they did not believe it to be in their best interest to 
intervene.”27 
 Bass argues that the politics of war crimes tribunals is really a story of the 
constant tension between liberal ideas and crude self-interest.28 The single biggest 
challenge for international war crimes tribunals has been the unwillingness of even liberal 
states to endanger their own soldiers, either by arresting war criminals or in subsequent 
reprisals. Holbrooke, among others, has explained the Pentagon’s reluctance to pursue 
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Bosnian war criminals as a product of what he calls Washington’s “Vietmalia 
syndrome,”29 referring to the casualties of Vietnam and Somalia. 
 However, there is a powerful idealism present in liberal states which pushes back 
these more self-interested principles, so the future outlook is not totally bleak. Bass notes 
this observation in his book: Although citizens tend to come before foreigners, liberal 
states also have a universalistic strand built in – a domestic ideology that sees rights as 
universal and unavoidable, which can thus force liberal states to worry about the plight of 
foreigners. From the eventual intervention in Yugoslavia, to the present-day movement to 
send aid to Darfur, this struggle between the self-serving and humanitarian impulses 
resurfaces time and again.  This humanitarianism can be a potent force in the making of a 
liberal states’ foreign policy. 
Lastly, complicating matters even more is the absence of a reliable enforcement 
mechanism at the international level. This is the main reason, as Roach outlines, why the 
efficacy of the rule of law is often subjugated to the rule of state sovereignty (since only 
the State possesses a standing army to enforce the rule of law).30 However, Roach also 
argues that to say that the rule of law cannot exist in some form at the international level, 
nor continue to evolve, is to ignore the implications of the continuing trend toward global 
governance.31 
 
The Creation of the ICTY: A New Kind of Tribunal? 
Historical Precedence of Criminal Tribunals: The Case of Nuremburg 
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 Following World War II, the four Allied powers established the International 
Military Tribunal for Nuremburg on August 8, 1945, by implementing the London 
Accord. This accord contained 33 articles which set forth the structure of the tribunal and 
listed the elements of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, 
with jurisdiction only extended to Nazi and Italian officials.32 
  While these trials have been championed by human rights activists, Bass argues 
that they are envisioned as more selfless than they actually were at the time.  To the 
American and British governments, these trials were largely about denouncing German 
aggression, and much less about punishing crimes against humanity (referring to the 
Holocaust) that people primarily remember Nuremberg for today.33 Furthermore, Bass 
believes the single biggest defect of the trials was the concerted Soviet effort to make 
Nuremberg into a travesty: a propaganda-filled, show-trial that Stalin’s Russia was 
accustomed to at the time. Ironically, it was the Europe’s leading democracy, Britain, 
which was opposed to the trials taking place. Winston Churchill lobbied to have Nazi 
leaders shot without trial, while the totalitarian Soviet Union pushed for them to take 
place.34  For many critics, these trials were a prominent display of victor’s justice. 
 Despite this, Bass argues it is significant that the victors even took an interest in 
justice. Nuremberg was followed by a series of international gestures aimed at outlawing 
crimes against humanity, including a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1946 
affirming Nuremberg’s charter and judgment, and the UN’s 1948 adoption of the 
Genocide Convention. Bass quotes Richard Goldstone, the first chief prosecutor of The 
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Hague and Rwanda tribunals, who says “the recognition of crimes against humanity was 
the most important legacy of Nuremberg.” 35 
 At that point in time, the legitimacy of the UN offered a unique opportunity to test 
and even push the validity of boundaries of international criminal law. At the very least, 
it encouraged addressing the difficult issues regarding the inviolability of state 
sovereignty and the need to assess the relationship between the universality of heinous 
crimes and state irresponsibility.36 
Creation of the ICTY 
 The UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in 
The Hague, is the first international war crimes tribunal since Nuremberg.  Given the 
increasing number of confirmed eyewitness reports of unlawful detentions and mass 
killings in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many leaders and policymakers had become convinced 
that the lack of international (and domestic) accountability had produced a culture of 
impunity. This provided the rationale for the unprecedented decision by the UN Security 
Council to establish the ICTY pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter in 1993 (and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] in 1994), established by Security 
Council resolution 827, passed on 25 May 1993. 37  The ICTY intends to offer an 
efficient and effective ad hoc juridical framework for investigating and prosecuting the 
perpetrators of crimes that took place during the Yugoslavia war (1991 – 1995) and 
within Yugoslavia’s 1991 borders.38 
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 The ICTY Statute, which sets forth the Office of the Prosecutor, Judiciary (a 
chamber of judges and appeals chamber), and Registry, contains 24 articles, four of 
which enumerate the categories of crimes: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention, violations of the laws and customs of war, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide.39  Accordingly, it empowers the Prosecutor to investigate the core crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and it allows the Prosecutor to 
conduct its judicial affairs independently of the Security Council and to focus on the 
individualization of guilt of the perpetrators.40 
 According to the court’s founding documents, the objective of its establishment 
was to take action to redress or stop the ethnic conflict and inter-communal violence that 
occurred in the region since 1991, and respond to the threat to international peace and 
security posed by those serious violations.41However, there has been some debate about 
the larger objectives of the court – whether it was to establish a culture of deterring future 
perpetrators, or if it provided an alternative security option to sending troops into 
Yugoslavia.42  
Issues with the ICTY 
   Roach believes that the ICTY provides a crucial historical turn in international 
criminal justice since it eliminates the politics of victors’ justice, while also constituting 
an arguably important deterrent effect, which has withered the culture of impunity in the 
region.43 Akhavan, likewise, agrees that precedents of accountability, however selected 
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and limited, contributes to the transformation of a culture of impunity that has hitherto 
implied the political acceptability of massive human rights abuses.44 
 However, the ICTY Prosecutor’s discretionary power has generated political 
tensions between states and the ICTY. Here, the Serbs have contended that the ICTY has 
targeted a disproportionate number of their own ethnic group, the most high-profiled 
indictment being charged to Slobodan Milosević.45 It is precisely this claim of bias that 
allowed Milosević to conduct a long, drawn-out trial in The Hague where he stood 
accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
A Modern-day Nuremburg? 
 Similar problems which face the ICTY plagued earlier tribunals. The Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals after World War II have been viewed as both laudable attempts to 
“stay the hand of vengeance” and as a form of victor’s justice. Likewise, realist critics 
argue that such criminal tribunals (like Nuremburg and the ICTY) are only created when 
the interests of major powers have been affected, and that the institutions’ structure and 
decisions are inherently compromised. International criminal tribunals, according to this 
reasoning, can never escape the political interests that led to their creation and these 
biases will tend to promote the international community’s interest in deterrence and 
retribution and tend to work against the interests of the accused.46 
Few expected the creation of the ICTY to be effective in capturing and 
prosecuting those responsible for the ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and other atrocities 
from the Balkan wars of the early nineties. Many, like Holbrooke, saw the creation of the 
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ICTY as a public relations maneuver designed to deflect attention from the inability of 
the United Nations to stop the Balkan wars.47  Bass states, “…the establishment of the 
Hague tribunal was an act of tokenism by the world community, which was largely 
unwilling to intervene in ex-Yugoslavia but did not mind creating an institution that 
would give the appearance of moral concern.  The world would prosecute the crimes that 
it would not prevent. The tribunal was built to flounder.”48 As Roach outlines, to the 
extent that this option would save lives and reduce military costs, it would also provide a 
cost-effective alternative to military intervention.49 
 As Meernik points out in his research, “Victor’s Justice or the Law?”, there is 
certainly a lot riding on the effectiveness of the ICTY’s work and its ability to fulfill the 
United Nation’s mandate “to do justice.” His research draws on the two opposing theories 
of international relations to this topic: Are such tribunals fair and unbiased and thus 
beneficial to the promotion of peace, according to liberal theory? Or, are they infused 
with the politics of major world powers that can interfere with the efforts to end the cycle 
of violence, a realist perspective?50 
 He initially hypothesizes that the resources, experience, and moral forces are 
weighted heavily in favor of the international community and that it is likely the accused 
cannot obtain a fair contest.  Based on a series of hypotheses regarding the influence of 
these legal and political procedures on judgment and punishment of the accused, he 
develops a statistical model to assess these factors on the judges’ verdicts and sentences. 
He concludes that the evidence is generally in favor of the legitimacy of the courts, and 
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that political factors largely do not explain verdicts or sentences. Rather, those found 
guilty received punishment in proportion to the number and severity of crimes 
committed, and no ethnic groups are singled out for unequal treatment.51 
 According to the court, by trying individuals on the basis of their personal 
responsibility, be it direct or indirect, the ICTY personalizes guilt. Accordingly, this 
shields entire communities from being labeled as collectively responsible for others’ 
suffering.52 The aim of the individualization of guilt, in this instance, is to distinguish the 
guilt of individuals from their communities, and thereby limiting the perception of 
collective guilt and arguably favoring reconciliation. While this is the intention of the 
ICTY, Roach argues that whether or not the tribunal has accomplished this task of 
reconciliation remains open-ended.53 
However, the significance of the apprehension and trials of Milosević, as well as 
other major military leaders from the war, has countered the argument that the tribunal is 
only another Nuremburg. As the court boasts: “For the first time in legal history, an 
indictment was filed, by the ICTY Prosecutor, against an acting Head of State, Slobodan 
Milosević, for crimes allegedly committed while he was in office. Other individuals 
holding the highest political and military office have also been indicted.”54 
 
The Effectiveness of Tribunals: Case Study of the Former Yugoslavia 
Perceptions from the Balkans 
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 Saxon, a former prosecutor at the ICTY, evaluates how Serbs, Croats, and 
Muslims (the three significant nationalities of the former Yugoslavia) view the ICTY’s 
compliance with its mission and offers his views on where it has succeeded and failed as 
a tool of peace and international justice.  
 He outlines the perspective of these ethnic groups in the Balkans, and his insights 
are vital to understanding how these minorities perceive such institutions and the attitudes 
they carry towards each other. Significantly, he states:  
In my experience as a prosecutor at the ICTY, each national party to the 
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia attempts to use the trials to 
present – and create – its own version of the history of the war. The ICTY 
is often perceived as having the ability to formally designate a particular 
national group with “victim” or “perpetrator” status. The “creation” of 
such simplistic versions of history often becomes extremely important to 
the accused in ICTY courtrooms, just as important as the formal legal 
proceedings dedicated to discerning the truth.55 
 
Nationalities in the Balkans have a long history of being dominated or repressed, so this 
distinction between victim and perpetrator can be easily manipulated to a people’s 
advantage. Each of the three primary nationalities in the region views themselves as 
victims rather than perpetrators of aggression and atrocities against other parties.56 Such 
is the nature of ethnic conflict in general, and nationalistic sentiments have the potential 
of undermining the court’s legitimacy for one group or breeding further resentment 
between ethnic groups if verdicts are viewed as unbalanced or biased. 
 Furthermore, it is essential to understand that the former Yugoslavia has no 
history or tradition of a strong, independent judiciary. Even today, according to a BBC 
report, Serbia and Montenegro are referred to as “a region renowned for organized crime 
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and corruption.”57 Democratic values are not easily exportable, especially when an area 
has no historical foundation for such values. In this light, the international community’s 
goal of bringing “the rule of law” to the region, via the ICTY, was perceived as a very 
ambitious. Saxon argues that even where the concept was understood, residents would be 
just as likely to view the establishment of the rule of law as an idealistic Western dream 
rather than a Balkan reality.58 
Arguments against Tribunals and the ICTY 
Throughout his book, Bass outlines what he describes as “a dizzying array of lofty 
objectives for international war crimes tribunals” set forth by legalists. According to 
Bass’ interpretation, “they are to bring justice, establish peace, outlaw war all together, 
ease bitterness, or establish new international norms that will help lift us out of 
anarchy.”59 Bass argues that these sweeping claims have become accepted as a kind of 
orthodoxy among human rights activists, who frequently cite the success of Nuremburg, 
with little other empirical proof or study to back up the claim. Bass argues that “although 
most people have a sense that prosecuting war criminals is a morally good thing to do, 
there is no reliable proof that doing so will always have good results.”60 
 Bass says there are many reasons to be skeptical of the notion that war crimes 
trials are always appropriate.  He notes that due process may interfere with substantive 
justice, through technical acquittals and delays in punishing people who “richly deserve 
it.” The spectacle of foreign-imposed trials may cause a nationalist backlash. Or, a 
moralistic insistence on punishing war crimes may make it impossible to do business 
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with “bloodstained leaders who, however repulsive, might end a war.” When politics is 
linked to law, he argues, crucial flexibility is lost – potentially with catastrophic results.61 
 As the political tensions unfolded in Yugoslavia from the late 1990s onward, the 
international community did not initially involve itself to a great degree. It was more 
preoccupied with other major international problems, notably the impending collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the Gulf War in Iraq. It was only by late June 1991 that any 
significant steps were taken to contain and control what had begun as a political crisis 
and evolved into a military crisis of significant magnitude.62 At heart, these criticisms 
stem from the belief that politics inspired the design and influences the work of the 
ICTY. Because the United Nations Security Council could have authorized any such 
institutions to adjudicate a number of bloody conflicts, but chose instead to create only 
two particular tribunals (the ICTY and the ICTR), it acted selectively and politically. 
Therefore, if international criminal tribunals are created only when the interests of major 
world powers are affected, their institutional structure and their decisions are 
compromised.63 Furthermore, realists and proponents of realpolitik argue that every 
conflict is unique: the variables of each conflict are diverse and they cannot be 
categorized or characterized in a way that a common international legal regime can be 
applicable to all of these heterogeneous conflicts.64 
Observers of the ICTY’s proceedings also doubt some of the technical capabilities 
of the court to bring peace and deliver positive results. Ralph Zacklin, the UN’s Assistant 
Secretary General for Legal Affairs, once stated in a published article that “the ad hoc 
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Tribunals have been too costly, too inefficient and too ineffective. As mechanisms for 
dealing with justice in post-conflict societies, they exemplify an approach that is no 
longer politically or financially viable.”65 The court’s budget for the year 2008 – 09 alone 
totaled over $342 million, a cost which is borne by all UN member nations.66 The 
physical distance of the tribunal from the actual victims also raises concern: The Hague 
lies over a thousand miles from the countries that comprised Yugoslavia, and those who 
suffered persecution or wish to testify can find it cumbersome to travel such a distance.67 
In the case of Milosević, some argue that he “escaped justice” by dying before his trial 
had concluded – despite the fact that it had dragged on for almost six years.68 Lastly, the 
highly technical, formalistic, and adversarial proceedings of the ICTY may not be the 
most effective forum for describing and understanding the complex and traumatic 
histories brought before it. Saxon explains, “The ICTY has, with mixed results, used 
predominantly ‘common law’ methods and procedures in an attempt ‘to normalize the 
extraordinary trial.’”69 Along these lines, it is believed that few people from the region 
have acquired a broad understanding of the cases or how the ICTY itself functions, which 
creates a sense of alienation between the courts’ proceedings and the population it intends 
to serve.70 
Support for Tribunals and the ICTY 
 It is undeniable that ethnic groups within Yugoslavia have nursed deep-seeded 
grievances against one another for some time. But in and of itself, ethnic friction, no 
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matter how serious, did not make the tragedy inevitable – or the three ethnic groups 
equally guilty.71 While history, and particularly the carnage of WWII, provided plenty of 
tinder for ethnic hatred in Yugoslavia, it took the institution of nationalism from the top 
down, inoculated primarily through the medium of television. Many people in the 
Balkans may have been bigoted, but in Yugoslavia it is their leaders who have been 
criminal.72 As Holbrooke notes of his experience in the Balkans:  
The only mechanism for dealing with such problems was imperfect but 
vital: the International War Crimes Tribunal, located at The Hague. When 
it was established by the UN Security Council in 1993, the tribunal was 
widely viewed as little more than a public relations device.  It got off to a 
slow start…During our negotiations, the tribunal emerged as a valuable 
instrument of policy that allowed us, for example, to bar Karadzic and all 
other indicted war criminals from public office. Yet no mechanism existed 
for the arrest of indicted war criminals.73 
 
The dramatic dethronement of once seemingly invincible architects of a “Greater Serbia” 
and ethnic cleansing (namely Milosević and Karadžić), has gone far beyond what most 
observers imagined was possible when the ICTY was first established in 1993.   
 To address the argument that tribunals are highly politicized, and therefore 
corrupt in a sense, some scholars argue that the suggestion of law being divorced from 
politics is a naïve perspective. As Saxon states, “law is only an extension of politics, and 
if well-reasoned legal decisions can create more favorable conditions (i.e. political 
decisions) for the respect of human rights, there seems nothing inappropriate for using the 
law as such a benevolent tool.”74 By focusing its prosecutions on the most notorious 
defendants, like Milosević and Karadžić, the Tribunal sends a strong political message 
that no one is above the law. This prioritization of who to prosecute also targets the 
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criminals who have often amassed large amounts of illegitimate power during the 
conflict.75 
 Furthermore, Madeline Albright, former secretary of state and an adamant 
legalist, said upon visiting the Hague tribunal in 1997:  
Justice is essential to strengthen the rule of law, soften the bitterness of 
victims’ families, and remove an obstacle to cooperation among the 
parties. It will help ensure that our forces can depart Bosnia without the 
fear that renewed violence threatening U.S. interests might one day return. 
It will establish a model for resolving ethnic differences by the force of 
law rather than the law of force.76 
 
Despite their ad hoc mandates, the ICTY directly influenced the adoption of the statute of 
the ICC at the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference.77 With the precedents established with 
the ICTY, the ICC blueprint for a future international criminal justice system, however 
limited, has raised accountability to an unprecedented prominence in the international 
system. The spread of accountability reflects the early glimmerings of an effective 
international justice system. 
 Along these lines, Rodden acknowledges that Milosević’s death in 2006 
precluded a certain kind of justice; however, he argues that great strides were made in his 
trial toward a standard of international justice. Many midlevel Belgrade bureaucrats 
testified against him before the ICTY, and the ICC is now pursuing similar inquiries with 
regard to the Congo, Darfur, and other places.  
 The creation of the ICTY’s “Outreach Program” has been an attempt to reconcile 
the possible alienation victims might experience from the court’s distant proceedings. 
According to the ICTY website, this program strives to make the Tribunal's activities 
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transparent, accessible, and intelligible to communities in the affected regions by 
engaging the local media, legal community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
youth-based programs. The program also provides legal aid to the prosecutors of 
domestic war crimes trials.78 Programs of this nature create an essential bridge between 
the formal legal procedures and the real human emotion tied to these cases, and should be 
expanded to ensure the positive ramifications of the Tribunal’s work. 
 Finally, Saxon argues that although the wounds of the past are far from being 
healed, the ICTY has, at a minimum, played an important role in moving the process 
forward and forcing entire communities to confront the worst parts of their histories.  
While it will take generations before reconciliation is legitimately realized, discovering 
the truth of the past, at least, should provide some hope that history does not repeat itself. 
 
Conclusion – Are War Crimes Tribunals Effective? 
Realists in international relations maintain that international institutions are 
superfluous.  International institutions merely reflect the underlying balance of power, 
and at worst they are misguided because they inject moral issues with their 
accompanying bias into diplomacy.79 However, with the growing interconnectedness 
among states as a result of globalization, it is obvious that the global trend is toward 
increased cooperation and communication among states; if anything, for efficiency’s 
sake. Furthermore, there has been a drive for increased accountability of states, especially 
with regard to grave humanitarian crimes. Overall, international criminal law has been 
developing, and will continue to develop, over the next few years.  Relevant literature has 
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outlined the concerns with international criminal tribunals as well as the potential benefits 
that can be reaped by them; so far, the results have been mostly positive with regard to 
the ICTY. There is a growing adherence to the findings of the court and its judgments 
have been effective at holding individuals accountable for war crimes. 
 Roach argues that in the case of international collective intervention into 
humanitarian emergencies, new rules and principles will need to be devised that replace 
the traditional rules of the UN charter (referring to the principles of non-intervention and 
the sovereign equality of states) and that challenge conventional notions of global 
power.80 
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Methodology 
 Engaging the community of the former Yugoslavia proved to be a bit of a 
logistical challenge for my thesis research. In order to obtain the broadest representation 
of the work of the Tribunal, as well as the local communities affected by the war and the 
Tribunal’s sentences, I wanted to contact individuals, organizations, and institutions that 
had affiliations with both the Tribunal itself and ties with the local community. 
Interviews were conducted primarily by email with the non-governmental organization 
Human Rights Watch and with three representatives of the ICTY Outreach Office. In 
addition to interviews, my research was supplemented with pertinent literature provided 
by my community partners as well as current articles published from reliable news 
sources. 
 I chose to contact Human Rights Watch because the organization is very active in 
monitoring the progress of ICTY trials. While they certainly take a legalist approach to 
their international work81, I felt the organization was extremely reputable and would 
nevertheless provide a perspective independent of my UN contacts. Through my initial 
communication with their offices, I was given a reference to Ms. Param Preet Singh, a 
counsel with the International Justice Program, who I was told would be monitoring the 
trial of Radovan Karadžić during the year. I enthusiastically tried to arrange an interview, 
but unfortunately she was out of the office for an extended amount of time and I was 
unable to personally speak with her.  Despite this drawback, her colleague Ms. Mia 
Psorn, an associate with the International Justice Program, sent a report on the ICC which 
Ms. Singh authored, titled “Courting History,” as well as a report from July 2008 titled 
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“Still Waiting: Bringing Justice for War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and 
Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Cantonal and District Courts.” Both reports were 
able to provide critical accounts of the successes and failures of the ICC and ICTY 
through personal interviews with government representatives and local NGO groups. 
 My communication with the ICTY Outreach offices came about by coincidence 
while I was searching for contact information for the Tribunal. The ICTY Outreach 
Programme is the official representative of the Tribunal's Registry in the region of the 
former Yugoslavia, and according to the Programme’s mission, it “aims to communicate 
to the people of the former Yugoslavia the importance of holding accountable individuals 
who violate international humanitarian law and the significance of rendering justice to 
victims.”82 Outreach engages the regional media and legal community, supports local 
non-governmental organizations and youth-based programs, works with international 
organizations and the diplomatic community, and speaks directly to victims and the 
general public. In addition to the main operations and administrative office in The Hague, 
the Outreach Programme consists of four regional offices in Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade 
and Pristina.  
 I established contact with representatives at the Outreach Programme initially 
through email communications and followed up with a phone interview. My primary 
contacts were Magdalena Spalinska, information officer with the Outreach Programme, 
and her colleague Rebecca Cuthill, who also works at the Hague office. They provided 
general insights to the work of the Tribunal and provided a wealth of information for my 
research, including documents and reports that I would have been unable to obtain 
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without their assistance.83 Ms. Cuthill also referred me to Mr. Refik Hodzic, a colleague 
from the Sarajevo regional office, who would have been able to answer questions 
pertaining to the receptiveness of the Outreach programs in Bosnia and answer questions 
about the transfer of cases from The Hague to domestic courts. Unfortunately, after much 
persistence, I was unable to personally communicate with Mr. Hodzic in a suitable 
amount of time because he was frequently traveling out of the office. 
 In addition to interviews, I chose to supplement my research with a survey 
published by the BBC on August 1, 2008 regarding Radovan Karadžić’s first appearance 
before the ICTY. 84 This article polled the opinions of people living in Serbia and Bosnia 
to survey their reactions to the indictment of this high-profile military commander.  It 
was beneficial to have a source which was independent of the ICTY and proved to be an 
insightful and effective tool to gauge sentiments of local residents. Also, since I was 
unable to procure this kind of information myself, this reliable and independent data 
source proved to be a viable alternative. This information served as a basis for many of 
the questions I asked my community partners about the receptiveness of different ethnic 
groups to the activities of the Tribunal. 
 Although I was unable to obtain the amount of personal commentary I originally 
hoped for, the representatives at the ICTY Outreach office were extraordinarily helpful in 
the amount of additional resources they provided. Initially, I expected the bureaucratic 
offices of the UN to be the most cumbersome to communicate with; but to my surprise, 
Ms. Spalinska and Ms. Cuthill were the most open, engaging, and helpful contacts by far. 
The information I obtained from them was very pertinent and provided an important 
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foundation for the conclusions I have drawn in this research. The UN documents I 
reviewed from their offices were also very consistent with the accounts given in the 
Human Rights Watch report on Bosnia. Overall, I believe I was able to obtain an accurate 
and complete picture of the Tribunal’s effectiveness in local communities through these 
resources and information. 
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Findings 
 The most important finding of my research was the discovery that an official 
liaison office exists in conjunction with the ICTY. Given its significant size and scope, I 
was surprised that it had not been referenced in the literature I reviewed about this 
Tribunal. The Outreach Programme seeks to address most of the problems the Tribunal is 
critiqued for, and its sole purpose is working to establishing a connection between the 
UN Tribunal and the local communities in the Balkans.  Therefore, their activities 
became central to my research. 
 In 2008, Human Rights Watch created a report detailing the transfer of cases from 
the ICTY to cantonal and district courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This document 
provides an excellent overview of many residual problems that remain in the region with 
the prosecution of war crimes. In particular, the researchers in the report highlighted the 
importance of domestic trials to victims:  
The fact that the ICTY and the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
generally have jurisdiction over cases dealing with more senior 
perpetrators or more politically sensitive crimes does not mean that the 
crimes tried before cantonal and district courts are not very serious. In 
fact, for many victims, trials of people who physically committed the 
atrocities, rather than their leaders, may be of greater importance.85 
 
This point reflects the more general accusation made against the ICTY: That first, by 
holding trials physically far away from victims, and second, by only prosecuting high 
profile leaders who commanded such atrocities (rather than those who actually carried 
out the violence), international tribunal systems alienate justice from the victims they aim 
to serve. 
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 Through my research, however, I was able to learn that as part of the Tribunal's 
completion strategy,86 the Outreach office is working to transfer cases to local and 
regional courts and strengthen the legitimacy of these domestic institutions. This kind of 
collaboration involves the distribution of key legal documents in Serbian, Croatian, and 
Bosnian languages, as well as the training and education of legal professionals through 
roundtables, seminars and conferences. 
 The same document from Human Rights Watch asserts the need for prosecutors to 
build stronger relationships and communication with witnesses and victims.  One NGO 
representative told Human Rights Watch that many victims lacked information and 
knowledge of the workings of the court system and believed that prosecutors were 
capable of bringing indictments without witness participation. Witnesses’ lack of 
participation has fueled resentment among many prosecutors, with some asserting that 
witnesses change their testimony due to bribes from defense attorneys. It is imperative 
that steps be taken to combat this lack of trust so that prosecutors and victims can achieve 
the common goal of successfully prosecuting crimes committed during the war. The 
recommendations provided by Human Rights Watch state: 
Providing adequate witness support and protection services would go 
some of the way to overcoming this, but other steps are also needed. 
Outreach is essential to this. Prosecutors who have been able to effectively 
use witness testimony in prosecutions of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or genocide cite repeated, sustained contact with witnesses as a 
key tool to building trust and to overcoming suspicion, especially across 
ethnic lines.87 
 
 In working with the ICTY Outreach office, I was able to learn a significant 
amount about the programs and the collaborations they have with both the international 
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and local community.  Of particular interest was the “Bridging the Gap” series which 
took place in 2004 in conjunction with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights.88 This 
was a series of events which took place in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where some 
of the most notorious crimes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction were committed. This 
event, considered a landmark by the Tribunal, was specifically intended to “bridge the 
gap” between the local communities and the Tribunal’s legal community. The 
participants in this series of conferences consisted of victims associations, municipal 
authorities, judicial institutions and law enforcement agencies, local politicians, and civil 
society representatives.89 These conferences were specifically targeted towards 
communities of ethnically mixed populations with the intention of creating dialogue 
between ethnic groups, civilian groups, and legal representatives – both international and 
national.  
 In many instances, both victim groups and prosecutors expressed their frustration 
with the justice process. These sentiments were documented in the Human Rights Watch 
Report on Bosnia: 
One NGO stated that an outreach event that they organized began with 
mutual recrimination where victims’ groups attacked prosecutors for lack 
of action and prosecutors blamed victims for refusing to participate and 
for changing their testimony.90 
 
Among other issues, victims and witnesses expressed their confusion with understanding 
the legal processes, and prosecutors complained of uncooperative witness participation. 
However, from additional accounts gathered at this conference, even those who were 
                                                 
88
 Source of this information is highlighted in Appendix 1: interview with Ms. Magdalena Spalinska of the 
ICTY Outreach office. 
89
 As stated by Magdalena Spalinska, Appendix 1. 
90
 “Still Waiting,” HRW Report, 60. 
 38 
frustrated with the entire situation were pleased to have a venue to voice these 
resentments: 
This airing of grievances was ultimately helpful as it began a dialogue 
between victims’ groups and prosecutors that had not previously been 
possible. Another person said that outreach events helped break down 
prejudices and fostered communication. Another participant stressed the 
importance of including religious leaders in outreach events: their views 
can carry tremendous weight in some communities, and it is important that 
they be part of the broader discussion of accountability for war crimes.91 
 
The creation of dialogue in this way is vital for improvements to be made in the justice 
process and for the process of peace and reconciliation to be possible. Ms. Spalinska from 
the Outreach office stated that “victims, who had testified at the Tribunal … praised the 
event and additionally some stated that without the ICTY nothing ever would have been 
done for them.”92 She also provided a documented response from one of the attendees at 
an event in Prijedor:  
…Meetings like this one, that is what the people need. The Serbs and the 
Muslims are still full of distrust for one another. But that is not the same as 
war. We have never really understood the cruelty of that time. We still 
don’t really understand it.93  
 
Comments like these reflect the importance of ICTY Outreach efforts in bringing all of 
these different groups together into dialogue, both to express gratitude for the work of the 
Tribunal and to express their frustration. Conference series like this have been replicated 
in other former Yugoslav republics since 2004 and there has been significant media 
coverage surrounding the events, which greatly enhances their impact and spreads 
awareness of these issues. 
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 Another essential element to Tribunal, aside from the establishment of justice, is 
the determination of truth. By allowing victims to come forward and have their stories 
recorded, a documented history is established and acknowledgement of the atrocities that 
occurred is possible. The nature of ethnic conflict, as with any war, is chaotic and filled 
with strong nationalistic sentiment, propaganda, and contempt for the “enemy.” An 
independent institutional apparatus, like the ICTY, is extremely beneficial in this regard 
and necessary as these states recover from the destruction of the war. Furthermore, with 
events like Bridging the Gap, Ms. Spalinska explains that:  
Tribunal investigators, prosecutors and chambers staff provide an insight 
into the meticulous and painstaking investigations conducted by the 
tribunal and explained how the crimes and the responsibility of the 
perpetrators were proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the court.94 
 
This is the most basic foundation to creating sustainable and peaceful relations in the 
region. Reconciliation is achieved only by first establishing the truth of what happened. 
 Along these lines, the Tribunal announced the launch of its online records 
database on April 6, 2009. 95  More than 150,000 public court records and documents, 
from the first filing submitted in 1994 through today, are now openly accessible to the 
world. This is a significant development for any global institution; with this action, the 
Tribunal is taking advantage of technology to make its processes more open and 
transparent. Furthermore, this diminishes the significance of its geographical distance.   
 Given the nature of the criticisms in the literature review, the Outreach 
Programme is a unique institution that is effective at creating a link between The Hague 
and the actual citizens of the Balkans who were affected by the crimes of the war. Given 
that the ICTY is the first Tribunal of its kind since Nuremburg, it should not be expected 
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to function perfectly since its inception. The failure of past tribunals has been largely due 
to their ineffectiveness at reconciling the sentiments of victimized populations. By 
including a significant liaison component to the legal framework of the Tribunal – a 
seemingly small structural change in the operations of a massive international institution 
– the benefits of the Tribunal’s work will actually permeate the society of the people it 
has affected.  
 Thucydides argued that politics is “the arena where conscience and power meet, 
and will be meeting until the end of time.” It is undeniable that politics have played a 
significant role in the creation and shaping of the ICTY and of international criminal 
jurisdiction as a whole. But what this shows, to me, is that the international community is 
collaborating in a way that harnesses the power of globalization to enforce human rights 
and justice for victims of mass atrocities. The spreading of Western legalism, in the 
interest of human rights abuses, should not be perceived as a negative aspect of 
globalization. Rather than viewing global governance as the imposition of a single 
(American or Western) solution to the problem, it is best seen as a way of supporting and 
sustaining governance at other levels.  
 The relationship between the ICTY and the sovereign states in the Balkans has 
fundamentally changed, in my eyes, through this research. The creation of this institution 
can certainly be seen as a form of intervention; but, after considering the finite mandate 
of the tribunal, in combination with the work of the Outreach Programme in aiding the 
proper development of local governments and prosecutors, the ICTY actually reinforces 
the importance of the sovereign state. Through this research, I began rethinking the 
notion that it must be either the national or the international sphere that holds power. 
 41 
Rather, they seem to work in conjunction with each other to develop and affirm their own 
authority. 
 Legal frameworks, while not a solution in themselves, are important because they 
have a very large impact on society.  Any politically and socially stable state requires a 
strong rule of law within an independent and trustworthy legal system. While local 
governments and courts are more directly accountable to their populations, at the time of 
the ICTY’s inception, the courts in the Balkans were not equipped to properly prosecute 
cases of this extreme nature. As of now, the evidence strongly supports the idea that the 
ICTY has created a standard of accountability for human rights abuses, when fifteen 
years ago, there was none. This would not be possible without the creation of the ICTY 
and its mechanism of implementation, the ICTY Outreach Programme. 
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Conclusion 
 Through this extensive research process, I have come to the conclusion that the 
ICTY, in conjunction with its Outreach Programme, provides effective model as an 
international criminal tribunal and has been a vital contributor of peace in the Balkan 
region. A legal solution, in and of itself, is not a total solution to the all of the issues 
created by the ethnic conflict in the 1990s. However, the extensive work of the liaison 
office has created a dynamic approach to reconciliation that was absent until this point in 
history. That is why, however important the actions of the court are, the extent of 
outreach work is single-handedly why it has been effective.  The Tribunal has established 
a rule of law in the midst of violent warfare and dissolution, has been a source of truth 
and investigation of the crimes committed, and its Outreach Programme has supported 
mediating efforts to encourage reconciliation and dialogue in local communities. 
 While the rule of law is a necessary component of any country that seeks to 
establish political and social stability, perhaps the most vital function of the Tribunal has 
been the establishment of accountability and responsibility for the war crimes that were 
committed.  The recordings of victim testimony, documentation of narratives, and the 
collection of evidence are all necessary for establishing the truth of what occurred at this 
time. The extensive documentation procedures of the court are a way of recording history 
as it happened, and not how people wish to think it happened.  
 By making the Tribunal’s work transparent – through the receptiveness of those 
working in the Outreach offices, the availability of court documents and proceedings on 
the internet, and regularly providing updates and special media programs to the public – 
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the ICTY is utilizing some of the greatest resources made possible by globalization: the 
diffusion of accessible information and the ease of communication.  
 Although it has not been a perfect reconciliation, as proved by nationalistic 
sentiments that still remain in Serbia,96 such strong feelings and resentments cannot be 
expected to simply evaporate once a war has ended.  It will likely take generations for 
relationships among ethnic groups to return to normal – as they were for centuries before 
the arrival of nationalism in the nineteenth century – but Outreach has done a significant 
amount of work targeting younger generations of Serbs, Bosnians, Muslims, and Croats, 
who will be more receptive to moving beyond the artificial divisions that incited this 
violence. What is significant about the Outreach’s programs, such as the Bridging the 
Gap series of 2004 mentioned earlier, is that it brings all of these different groups 
together in solidarity. 
 Although it is contended that only high profile leaders from this time have faced 
punishment, this alone sets an astonishing legal precedent, historically. It seems fitting 
that a high profile court would try high profile cases, and in fact, that is exactly what has 
happened. A large number of lesser claims are increasingly being brought to cantonal and 
district courts in former Yugoslav states now that the proper legal apparatuses have been 
developed to deal with them. 
 In fact, the transfer of cases back to national court systems is a defining feature of 
the ICTY and the Outreach program.  This conclusion is the least intuitive one I expected 
to draw from this research, but it is certainly the most compelling: Supra-national 
governing bodies do not necessarily erode state sovereignty, and in fact, I believe the 
structure of the ICTY is such that it re-affirms the importance of state sovereignty. The 
                                                 
96
 Documented in the BBC Survey, appendix 2 
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Tribunal, recognizing that national judiciaries are better equipped to address the 
grievances and deliver the justice that victims seek, has taken extensive measures to 
reform these domestic capabilities in the Balkans. In all actuality, global governance 
relies increasingly on effective national capabilities rather than the substitution of those 
capabilities, and the fact that the legitimacy of the Tribunal itself depends on the 
successful development of these Balkan states is evidence to this. The competitive 
worldview that pits supra-national institutions against sovereign nation is changing; and 
ultimately, global institutions can complement state authority, rather than simply pose a 
challenge to it.  
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Recommendations 
 Programs like Outreach are, in my opinion, the most defining aspect and crucial 
component to the success of the ICTY Tribunal. The scope and effectiveness of the 
Outreach Programme is a necessary element to the peace-building process and should be 
adapted to all other Tribunals dealing with ethnic conflict of this nature. A significant 
part of the work they do is aiding the development of local judiciaries which is an 
essential contribution to the peace and reconciliation process. By fostering the 
establishment of the rule of law, and creating a culture of capacity building and dialogue, 
sustainable peace is likely to develop for future generations in this area.  It is essential 
that the Outreach Programme continues to operate after the Tribunal’s mandate has 
expired so societal change can still occur long after justice has been served. 
 Possible avenues for future research include the role of international bodies like 
the European Union and the influence it has on the ICTY’s legitimacy.  Cooperation with 
the Tribunal has long been used as a bargaining chip for EU membership, which can be 
perceived as ideological coercion or a positive affect for the Tribunal.  
 Also, given the intense, nationalistic nature of the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, 
more research could be done to analyze at the impact of globalization on the nature of 
nationalism – whether it provokes individuals and groups to become more extreme or if 
the interconnected nature of globalization fosters more cooperation. 
 Overall, international war crimes tribunals like the ICTY are effective in so far as 
they restore order and the rule of law after violence has occurred; but ultimately, these 
situations are not inevitable, and a solution remains to be found for preventing these 
atrocities from happening in the first place. This problem might be best addressed by re-
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evaluating the roles of international organizations, revisiting the concepts of sovereignty 
and its relationship to responsibility in the international system, and defining the duties of 
intervention on behalf of the international community. Global institutions, like the UN 
and the ICTY, are created intentionally as facilitators of collective action in the 
international community, although the traditional notions of state sovereignty and power 
have impeded this.  It appears that while the world is continuously being changed and 
shaped by globalization, the rules of old-world politics are still being applied to these 
new and dynamic problems facing the century. The resources, humanitarian efforts, and 
will of the international community are abundantly available to address these issues, but 
they have yet to be harnessed in an effective way to change the course of such conflicts. 
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Appendix 1: Record of Contact with Magdalena Spalinska, ICTY Outreach 
Information Officer, and Rebecca Cuthill, ICTY Outreach 
 
 
Sent:   Tue 4/7/2009 9:37 AM   
From:   Rebecca Cuthill [Cuthill.icty@un.org]   
To:   Wasson, Elizabeth P 
 Subject:   RE: ICTY response 
Dear Elizabeth 
 
Thanks for the mail. 
 
What I was going to suggest you look at is firstly some information we have on our 
website regarding 11bis case transfers: 
http://www.icty.org/sid/8934 
and also the overview of the types of activities Outreach engages: 
http://www.icty.org/sid/8937 
You can see from this list that over the past 12 months or so key partners have included 
the OSCE, UNDP as well as locally based NGO's. I can discuss in further detail if you 
like. 
 
Articles discussing 11bis transfer include those written by Michael Bohlander, "The 
transfer of cases from international criminal tribunal to national courts" 
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/colloquium04/bohlander/Bohlander.pdf 
and "The transfer of cases before the ICTY to competent national jurisdictions", Tilman 
Blumenstock and Wayde Pittman. 
 
In addition I would encourage you contacting Refik as he can provide a far more 
thorough analysis of the situation "on the ground". 
 
I am not at work tomorrow but can be reached on Thursday. 
 
Warm regards 
Rebecca 
 
Rebecca Cuthill 
ICTY Outreach 
tel: +31 70 512 5759 
fax: +31 70 512 8953 
email: cuthill.icty@un.org 
 
Churchillplein 1 
2517 JW The Hague 
The Netherlands 
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__________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Sent: Tue 4/7/2009 8:26 AM 
From: Rebecca Cuthill [mailto:Cuthill.icty@un.org] 
To: Wasson, Elizabeth P 
Cc: Refik Hodzic 
Subject: RE: ICTY response 
 
 
Dear Elizabeth, 
 
Thank for your mail, 3pm this afternoon would be fine. 
 
However having looked at your questions I realise that as many deal with 
regional collaboration I would also suggest you speak to my colleague based 
in our Sarajevo office, Refik Hodzic. I have already spoken to him about 
your questions and have copied him on this e-mail so you may contact him 
directly. 
 
Having said that I am more than happy to chat and can probably point you to 
some interesting background information and articles relating to these 
issues. 
 
Warm regards 
Rebecca 
 
 ________________________ 
Rebecca Cuthill 
ICTY Outreach 
tel: +31 70 512 5759 
fax: +31 70 512 8953 
email: cuthill.icty@un.org 
 
Churchillplein 1 
2517 JW The Hague 
The Netherlands 
 
 
__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
From: "Wasson, Elizabeth P" ewasson@providence.edu 
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Sent:  07/04/2009 07:07                                                       
To:  "Rebecca Cuthill" Cuthill.icty@un.org 
Subject: RE: ICTY response 
 
 
Dear Rebecca, 
 
If you are available, I will call at 15:00 (if I am not mistaken, you are 
six hours ahead of the time in New York?). Please let me know if this is an 
inconvenient time. 
 
Generally, I am interested in learning more about how Outreach collaborates 
with local judiciaries - how the tribunal determines what cases to 
transfer, how many cases have been transferred, and more about the work 
Outreach does in developing and reforming national judiciaries. 
 
I was also wondering if you have any information on how Outreach works with 
NGOs or other special organizations in the region - Are there any 
organizations in particular that Outreach works closely with or any 
examples of recent collaborations? 
 
Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me. I look forward to 
talking with you! 
 
- Elizabeth Wasson 
ewasson@providence.edu 
Providence College 
549 River Ave 
Providence, RI 02918 
Tel. (651) 338-1828 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Rebecca Cuthill [mailto:Cuthill.icty@un.org] 
Sent: Mon 4/6/2009 9:15 AM 
To: Wasson, Elizabeth P 
Subject: RE: ICTY response 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Elizabeth 
 
Thanks for your e-mail, tomorrow, 7 April will be fine. Please let me know 
the time you plan to call and a list of questions would be most helpful. 
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Warm regards 
Rebecca 
 
Rebecca Cuthill 
ICTY Outreach 
tel: +31 70 512 5759 
fax: +31 70 512 8953 
email: cuthill.icty@un.org 
 
Churchillplein 1 
2517 JW The Hague 
The Netherlands 
 
________________________________ 
 
From: Magdalena Spalinska [mailto:spalinska@un.org] 
Sent: Mon 3/23/2009 6:53 AM 
To: Wasson, Elizabeth P 
Cc: Rebecca Cuthill 
Subject: ICTY response 
 
 
 
Dear Elizabeth, 
 
Thank you for your questions, which raise extremely interesting points on a 
number  of  levels.  We think it would be better if we could set aside some 
time  to  speak  to  you  about  these  issues. What we can do right now is 
provide  an  overview  of  the  Bridging  the  Gap series, what we hoped to 
achieve and some reactions from the audiences. 
 
Bridging the Gap / Overview 
Outreach,  in  conjunction  with the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in 
Republika  Srpska,  launched  a  series  of events in 2004, taking place in 
areas  where  some  of  the  most  notorious  crimes  under  the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction  were  committed.  They  were  a  series  of  landmark  events 
specifically  aimed  at  bridging the gap between the Tribunal and specific 
communities  in the region of the former Yugoslavia that were most effected 
by  the crimes that fall under the Tribunal's jurisdiction.  The events all 
took  place  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  were part of the Tribunal's 
strategic  plans  to ensure its activities are accessible and understood by 
communities  in  the  region  in order to cement a lasting peace and foster 
reconciliation. 
 
Using  layman's  terms,  Tribunal  investigators,  prosecutors and chambers 
staff   provided   an   insight   into   the   meticulous  and  painstaking 
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investigations  conducted  by the Tribunal and explained how the crimes and 
the  responsibility of the perpetrators were proven beyond reasonable doubt 
before  the  court.  A  total of five conferences were held in Brèko, Foèa, 
Konjic, Prijedor and Srebrenica. 
 
The public comprised members of victim associations, municipal authorities, 
judicial  institutions  and  law  enforcement  agencies,  as  well as local 
politicians  and  civil  society  representatives.  The  audiences  had the 
opportunity  to  ask questions from senior Tribunal staff who presented the 
findings with an openness that was a hallmark of this particular conference 
series. 
 
The  series  were  targeted at people living in the communities and as such 
were a "mixed population", of course victims were a key target group within 
this  and  their  reactions  /  response to the series were observed with a 
great  deal  of interest. At the time the type of comments we received were 
along the lines of: 
 
Srebrenica: 
After  the  conference  in  Srebrenica,  representatives  of  victim groups 
indicated  that  one  of  the  main  achievements  of  the event was to say 
publicly, and with authority, that genocide was indeed committed - and that 
it  could  no  longer  be  denied. Sarajevo daily Osloboðenje published the 
following:  "President  of  the  Association  of  Returnee  Women,  Hatidza 
Memiseviæ,  finds  the conference very important, in particular because the 
materials   presented  offer  irrefutable  evidence  about  the  crime  and 
criminals." 
 
Prijedor: 
"This was one of the most significant events in Prijedor in recent times" 
-Muharem Murseloviæ, BiH delegate, RS National Assembly 
 
Victim's,  who  had  testified  at the Tribunal, also praised the event and 
additionally some stated that without the ICTY nothing ever would have been 
done  for them. When asked if the situation in Prijedor was hopeless one of 
the attendees replied: 
 
"Not  at  all.  Meetings  like  this one, that is what the people need. The 
Serbs  and the Muslims are still full of distrust for one another. But that 
is not the same as war. We have never really understood the cruelty of that 
time. We still don't really understand it" 
 
In addition, significant media coverage followed the conferences, a good 
example of this was the thoughtful and impressive 15-minute 
mini-documentary about war crimes in Brèko that was broadcast on FTV's 
primetime "60 minutes" flagship investigative news programme. 
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On the back of the series Outreach worked closely with a Sarajevo-based 
production company to produce five complementary documentaries that were 
aired across the country to wide audiences (estimated to be around 2 
million people). 
 
The conference series has later been repeated, in a modified format, for 
Serbian audiences in cooperation with the Belgrade-based NGO Humanitarian 
Law Centre. 
 
 
 
Regarding the EU question - as this is a question about the EU policy, you 
are advised to inquire with the EU on that. 
 
Regarding the existence of Outreach after the closure of the Tribunal - 
this is an issue which is still being debated. In attachement you will find 
an interesting UN Security Council report discussing the issue of residual 
mechanisms that have to be considered before the ICTY completes its work. 
You will find public information and capacity building mentioned there. 
 
 
(See attached file: link to UN site and article Dec 2008.doc) 
 
 
Hope this information is useful in your research. As stated before, if you 
would like to talk on the phone about some further aspects, we are ready to 
coordinate on that. 
 
Best regards, 
 
 
Magdalena Spalinska 
Information Officer 
 
ICTY 
Outreach Programme 
Churchillplein 1 
2517 JW The Hague 
Netherlands 
Tel. +31 (0)70 512 8632 
Fax. +31 (0)70 512 8953 
 
________________________________________________ 
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From: Wasson, Elizabeth P 
Sent: Sun 3/8/2009 10:43 PM 
To: Magdalena Spalinska 
Cc: Cuthill.icty@un.org 
Subject: RE: Contact Referral 
 
Dear Ms. Spalinska and Ms. Cuthill, 
 
Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me. I recently 
completed an extensive literature review for my thesis on the topic of 
international criminal law and focused primarily on the ICTY. This Tribunal 
is of particular interest to me because so many other Tribunals have been 
modeled after it, and I think the ICTY has been a pioneering force in 
establishing international legal norms. High-profile cases like Milosevic's 
trial or Karadzic's pending trial seem to have bolstered the Tribunal's 
credibility despite the criticisms surrounding them. I found this research 
to be very interesting, especially in light of recent events like the 
indictment of Sudanese President Bashir to the ICC. It will be interesting 
to see how the international community responds to this and how events will 
unfold in the coming weeks. 
 
Critics of the ICTY often cite its distance and foreignness to the people 
it aims to serve as the main problem with such an institution. This is why 
I am really interested in the work of the Outreach Programme and how 
effective it has been. 
 
On the website, I read about a conference called "Bridging the Gap" that 
occurred in 2004-05. I was curious how well these kinds of programmes are 
received - do you encounter different reactions to the ICTY among different 
ethnic groups? Does this effect its legitimacy in any way or create more 
tension among ethnic groups? 
 
With the apprehension of Radovan Karadzic, some poeple have argued that EU 
ascension pressure has been more effective than mandates from the Tribunal 
itself to persuade authorities to cooperate with the court system. What is 
your take on this? 
 
Lastly, will the Outreach Programme continue to operate after the Tribunal 
is closed? 
 
I apologize for such a lengthy email - feel free to elaborate as much or as 
little as you like to these questions. Thank you so much for taking the 
time to do this, and I look forward to hearing from you! 
 
Best, 
Elizabeth Wasson 
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_______________________________________________ 
 
From: Magdalena Spalinska [mailto:spalinska@un.org] 
Sent: Fri 3/6/2009 11:27 AM 
To: Wasson, Elizabeth P 
Cc: Rebecca Cuthill 
Subject: Fw: Contact Referral 
 
 
 
Dear Ms Wasson, 
 
Thank you for your inquiry and interest in the ICTY. Myself and my collague 
Rebecca Cuthill (copied on this message) are representatives of the Hague 
Office of the ICTY Outreach Programme. We will be happy to receive your 
questions, and we will provide answers as much as we are able to, or 
forward to the collegues who may be in a better position to do so. 
 
We would also appreciate some more information about your research. 
 
Looking forward to hearing from you. 
 
With best regards, 
 
Magdalena Spalinska 
Information Officer 
 
ICTY 
Outreach Programme 
Churchillplein 1 
2517 JW The Hague 
Netherlands 
 
 
----- Forwarded by Magdalena Spalinska/CS/UNICTY on 06/03/2009 17:16 ----- 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
From: "Wasson, Elizabeth P” <ewasson@providence.edu>                   
Sent: 05/03/2009 22:46 
To: outreach@icty.org 
Subject: Contact Referral 
 
 
Hello, 
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My name is Elizabeth Wasson and I am a university student in the United 
States. I am currently working on a thesis project researching the ICC and 
the ICTY and their effectiveness in areas of ethnic conflict.  I have 
extensively read through your website and I am very interested in learning 
more about the work you do with the Tribunal. 
 
I was hoping to get in touch with some people affiliated with the Outreach 
Programme who have worked in the Balkan region or with the court to ask a 
few brief questions.  It would really help me synthesize my academic 
research with the opinions of those who work closely with these matters and 
can provide insight that book and journal articles cannot. 
 
If there is contact information for anyone that would be interested in 
speaking with me, please email at ewasson@providence.edu or I can also be 
reached on my cell phone at 1-651-338-1828. 
 
Thank you so much for your time and I greatly appreciate any help you can 
provide! 
 
- Elizabeth Wasson 
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Appendix 2: Copy of BBC News article from surveying Reactions to Radovan 
Karadzic’s pending trial at the ICTY 
 
 
Page last updated at 14:48 GMT, Friday, 1 August 2008 15:48 UK 
E-mail this to a friend  Printable version  
Karadzic trial: Readers' reaction  
BBC News website readers in Serbia and Bosnia have been reacting to Radovan 
Karadzic's first appearance at the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague on 
Thursday.  
Read a selection of their opposing views below.  
 
I am from Serbia and I am glad to see this criminal sent to The Hague. The protests here 
showed that the support for the war criminals comes from the worst corners of Serbian 
society. I am hopeful that my country is beginning to wake up and start seeing right from 
wrong. Patriots are not those who burn other people's houses. I am proud of Serbian 
history but not what Serbs did in the 1990s. We in Serbia have to face our past to be able 
to move ahead. Just like what the Germans did after the war. 
Ana, Serbia  
The Hague prosecutes only Serbs. If justice is not for all, it is not justice at all. 
Roman, Belgrade, Serbia  
Such a sad moment - another Serb in that illegitimate court! Everybody considers him 
guilty, so he stands no chance. The only way he'll get out of there is by dying. Hopefully 
he'll provide evidence and show what Richard Holbrooke and others really did, what 
their role in the war was. Arresting him was a very poor call by the newly formed Serb 
government. 
Milica Milivojevic, Belgrade, Serbia  
Karadzic has been caught, everyone knows about his crimes, even the Serbs wanted him 
arrested. However, his brainchild, a genocidal entity, Republika Srpska, built on the 
blood and tears of hundreds of thousands of innocent, continues to exist despite all the 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and exclusion that this entity within Bosnia itself continues to 
represent. You can't just have Karadzic tried for what he's done and leave his pet project, 
Srpska, in existence and continuing in his footsteps - obstructing the return of non-Serb 
refugees and obstructing all of the Bosnian state institutions, development and progress 
of the country. 
Ali, Bihac, Bosnia  
War is war, and Karadzic was defending our way of life. As always, only the losing side 
is put on trial, even though both parties committed these so-called crimes. What's worse, 
Karadzic is being judged by a foreign court that has no jurisdiction over Serbia, it's 
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nothing more than a show trial. If he's to stand trial, then what about George Bush? This 
trial is hypocrisy!  
David, Belgrade, Serbia  
The prosecution will have to prove that Karadzic actually planned, organised and ordered 
what he is charged with, and since this will be a very difficult task, the court may well 
end up in a position either to free him - that is politically unacceptable - or pass a guilty 
verdict and thus demonstrate political bias. In both cases Karadzic wins. 
Roman, Belgrade, Serbia  
It is important for the Serb population to understand that this is a necessary event that 
will allow us to move forward. Like many Serbs I find myself caught in the middle, 
where I truly don't know how to feel about this entire situation. It is heart wrenching that 
only Serb leaders have been tried and found guilty in The Hague, while other war 
criminals from the region walk free. The EU and the international community continue to 
leave Serbia with ultimatums that do not sit well with its people.  
I believe Karadzic's arrest is a stepping stone towards a stronger economic future and 
stability in the region. It is a shame that every couple of months, the world has to see 
protests in the streets of Belgrade that always end up in riots and chaos. We no longer 
have to ask ourselves why people look at us in a negative way. If you act like animals 
you'll be treated like animals. Unfortunately the world doesn't see Belgrade the other 362 
days of the year when there are no protests and when the city is filled with a positive 
atmosphere that cannot be matched anywhere in Europe.  
Nikola, Belgrade, Serbia  
It wasn't the secession of Serbs from Bosnia that ignited the war, but the secession of 
Bosnia from former Yugoslavia, and the insistence of Muslim and Croat leaders that their 
unilateral and unconstitutional separatist decisions obliged Serbs as well. The civil war 
that broke out generated atrocities on all three warring sides. Bearing in mind the fact 
that only Serb leadership is being prosecuted, and no single relevant Muslim or Croat 
politician or general, Karadzic's trial will neither contribute to justice or to long lasting 
peace, but will only stir up the passions. 
Branko, Belgrade, Serbia  
For me as Serb, this is only way to bring back the honour which Serbia and Serbs had 
before 1990. It's a fact that some Serbs committed war crimes. However, it's also a fact 
that for the majority of Serbs nowadays our national heroes are [tennis players] Novak 
Djokovic and Ana Ivanovic, not Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The majority of 
Serbs want Serbia to become an EU member by 2012 or 2014. 
Aleksandar Vuckovic, Kragujevac, Serbia  
Serbia has finally got rid of its biggest monster. I wish Karadzic good health, so he can 
receive his due sentence. 
Ivan, Pirot, Serbia  
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It seems that the prosecution's tactics are going to mostly rely on already finished cases, 
avoiding proving allegations from scratch. Taken together with the vague concept of 
command responsibility, his case may be lost from the start. This is the strategy: all right, 
we have proven that the atrocities had taken place; and second, you knew, or must have 
known of them, and you didn't stop them. Thus, you are guilty. But the problem with this 
approach is that no single president in just any conflict would be spared from the 
prosecutions.  
Marko, Belgrade, Serbia  
 
 
